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‘WE SOLEMNLY PROSCRIBE THIS POEM’: PERFORMATIVE UTTERANCES IN THE ROMANTIC 
PERIODICALS 
TOM MOLE 
Department of English, McGill University 
Abstract: 
This essay argues that many of the characteristic procedures of periodical writing in the 
Romantic period, such as accusing, ridiculing, insulting, libelling, condemning, judging, 
applauding, indicting, recommending, advising, or censuring, are best understood as 
performative utterances. Performative utterances can only be ‘felicitous’ (in J.L. Austin’s terms) 
if they are spoken by an authorized person in a recognised context; that authority must pre-exist 
the utterance.  Romantic periodical writers faced the double challenge of establishing themselves 
as authorities on their culture, and establishing periodical writing as the appropriate context in 
which to exercise this authority.  Their authority could only be located in their writing itself: as a 
result they created a self-authorising style.  That style was iterable: it gained its power through 
periodical reiteration.  It was also citational: it relied first on citing existing forms of authority 
and then on citing its own earlier iterations.  It could be used to define public figures, including 
other periodical writers.  But, as a result, it could also be turned against the periodical writers 
who deployed it.  Creatures of writing, made out of language, they could be unmade in language 
too. 
Paper: 
Commentating on the world around them was not enough for the most ambitious periodical 
writers of the early nineteenth century.  Not content with describing the world, they agreed with 
Karl Marx (a periodical writer and editor himself) that the point was to change it.  Employing a 
range of rhetorical strategies to shape the culture they inhabited, they evolved a style of writing 
with activist aspirations that aimed not simply to encourage or persuade people to do things, but 
actually to do things itself.  Jon Klancher influentially argued that periodicals were responsible 
for making English reading audiences, and in particular for helping to bring into being a middle-
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class audience that was conscious of its own distinct identity and its cultural power. But before 
periodical writers could make audiences, they had to make themselves, constructing a position of 
authority from whence they could produce effects in the world.  They made themselves in 
language, and more specifically in style, in a kind of style whose authority, finally, rested 
nowhere but in the style itself. 
Their style did not reflect the periodical writers’ power to define their readers’ experience 
of the world they inhabited – it was that power.  It aspired to produce effects that were not only 
perlocutionary but also illocutionary, so that when the periodical writers commented on the 
culture around them they were not making observations or offering opinions, but pronouncing 
verdicts and handing down judgments.  But while the legal authorities that they took as one of 
their models were well established, with an authority grounded in the state’s unwritten 
constitution or the social contract, the periodical writers sought simultaneously to exercise power 
and to construct the conditions that legitimated the exercise of that power.  The task facing the 
young men (and some women) who produced early-nineteenth-century periodicals, then, was to 
found a discursive regime that would actually give them the status of cultural arbiters that they 
freely claimed for themselves. 
Performative utterances were an important rhetorical weapon in this campaign.  J.L. 
Austin identified performative utterances as those that accomplish something in the act of being 
uttered.  For example, the utterance, ‘I name this ship’, uttered in the right circumstances and by 
the right person, constitutes the act of naming the ship in itself, rather than describing an act of 
naming that has taken place, or will take place, elsewhere.  This utterance is therefore not a 
statement of fact or belief, or a commentary on an act that exists apart from the utterance.  The 
utterance is the act.  Forms such as ‘I name’, ‘I pronounce’, ‘I bet’ and so on, if uttered in 
appropriate circumstances, bring about a new state of affairs, rather than describing an existing 
one.  More generally, Austin distinguishes the ‘illocutionary’ force of an utterance (the act I 
perform in saying it) from its ‘perlocutionary’ force (the effect I bring about by saying it).  So, 
for example, if I say that you should accept a job offer, Austin would distinguish between two 
things that occur: the illocutionary act is to advise you to accept, the perlocutionary effect may 
be to convince you to accept (Austin 102). But whether or not I convince you, there’s no denying 
that I advised you, because the illocutionary act was carried out in the utterance itself, not as a 
 3 
result of it.  Periodical writing’s characteristic procedures – accusing, ridiculing, insulting, 
libelling, condemning, judging, applauding, indicting, recommending, advising, censuring – can 
all be understood as performative utterances. 
Performatives are not statements, and so they cannot be described as either true or false, 
but only as ‘felicitous’ or ‘infelicitous’ (in Austin’s terms).  Either the utterance successfully 
performs an act (the ship is named, the bet is made, and so on) or it misfires in various ways.  So, 
for example, if the phrase ‘I name this ship’ is uttered, but not by the person authorised to do so, 
or not on the appropriate occasion, we shall agree that the ship has not, in fact, been named.  At 
the end of Coriolanus Act III, Sicinius, one of the tribunes of the people, pronounces the 
sentence of banishment on Coriolanus in a ceremonial performative utterance: 
[I]n the name a’ th’ people, 
And in the power of us the tribunes, we, 
Even from this instant, banish him our city, 
In peril of precipitation 
From off the rock Tarpeian, never more 
To enter our Rome gates.  I’ th’ people’s name, 
I say it shall be so. (III.iii.99-105) 
Here the sentence of banishment is performed in the act of uttering ‘we […] banish him’.  
Sicinius ceremonially embeds that performative utterance in a context that makes it felicitous.  
He starts by establishing his authority to utter the performative (‘in the name a’ th’ people, / And 
in the power of us the tribunes’), makes clear that the sentence is enacted in the moment of 
utterance (‘even from this instant’), reminds Coriolanus that he is in a position to enforce it (‘In 
peril of precipitation / From off the rock Tarpeian’), and concludes by reiterating it in a form that 
reflexively foregrounds the power of his own speech act (‘I say it shall be so’).  Sicinius insists 
on his authority partly because it is under threat in the power struggle between the nobles and the 
tribunes.  Earlier in the scene he and Brutus have stage-managed the people to shout their 
support and ‘with a din confus’d / Enforce the present execution / Of what we chance to 
sentence’ (III.iii.20-22).  But his insistence pays off, his performative utterance is felicitous, and 
Coriolanus is indeed banished.  Coriolanus’s response attempts a performative utterance of his 
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own – ‘I banish you!’ (III.iii.123).  He draws on his aristocratic sense that he should be 
exercising authority, not submitting to it, but his performative utterance cannot be felicitous, 
because he is not authorised, on this occasion, to pronounce the sentence of banishment.  His 
utterance appeals to a higher justice, but it misfires as a performative; it is arrogant but impotent.  
Coriolanus leaves Rome and the tribunes stay. 
That performative utterance ‘I banish you’ is repeated again and again, in various forms, 
in the reviews in Romantic periodicals.  I banish this poem from the libraries of our readers, I 
banish this poet from the ranks of genius, I banish this idea from the minds of right-thinking 
people. Who is entitled to utter this performative, and in what circumstances?  For the 
performative utterances of the periodical writers to be felicitous, two conditions had to be met.  
Firstly, the writers had to be recognised as people authorised to utter them, and secondly the 
periodicals had to be recognised as the appropriate venue for such pronouncements.  If these two 
conditions were met, then the periodicals could make a person praiseworthy or reprehensible by 
praising or reprehending that person.  Their utterances were like Sicinius’s performative, which 
actually does banish Coriolanus.  If they were not met, then the periodicals’ praise or 
reprehension was just one opinion among many, with no special force.  Their utterances were 
like Coriolanus’s performative, which despite sounding noble, banishes no one. 
 In Chapter 2 of Biographia Literaria, Coleridge attacked periodical writers as, ‘men, 
who being first scriblers [sic] from idleness and ignorance next become libellers from envy and 
malevolence’ (I, 41). The connection between periodical writing and libel, commonly made in 
the Romantic period, is related to a specific legal understanding of libel that illuminates its 
performative character.  William Blackstone, the authority on English law in the period, defined 
libels as ‘malicious defamations of any person […] made public by either printing, writing, signs 
or pictures, in order to provoke him to wrath, or expose him to public hatred, contempt, and 
ridicule’ (150). In civil law a libel was understood as a kind of personal injury or damage to 
property or livelihood (insofar as one’s reputation was a property, and having it tarnished could 
damage one’s livelihood).  Proving that the facts stated were true was therefore sufficient to get a 
libel case dismissed in civil court.  In criminal law, however, a libel was understood to be a kind 
of breach of the peace, which stirred up unrest, retribution and violence in the community.  In 
this case it did not matter to the law whether the statement was true or not, as Blackstone 
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explained: ‘it is immaterial with respect to the offence of a libel, whether the matter of it be true 
or false; since the provocation, and not the falsity, is the thing to be punished criminally’ (150).1 
Libels were therefore an especially problematic form of public discourse, because their 
truthfulness was not sufficient to make them acceptable, and their falsity was not sufficient to 
nullify their power.  Libels are effectively considered in criminal law as performative utterances, 
rather than statements making truth claims.  They may, indeed, entail statements whose truth can 
apparently be verified by the facts of the matter: when Blackwood’s called William Hazlitt 
‘pimpled Hazlitt’, he either did or did not have pimples on his face.  But the truthfulness is 
beside the point.  Such utterances bring about a state of affairs, and do not represent one: 
ridiculing Leigh Hunt did not mean describing something that was ridiculous about him, it meant 
making him ridiculous.  (‘Here we should say that in saying these words we are doing something 
[…] rather than reporting something’, Austin writes (13).)  There is no explicit form of words in 
common usage ‘I insult you’ or ‘I libel you’: these are implicit performatives that cannot be 
reduced to explicit forms.
2
 
Before they could speak with authority, periodical writers needed a position of authority 
from which to speak ex cathedra, ‘with all the seriousness that befits our high office’ (as the 
Monthly Review put it in its review of Southey’s Roderick (Anon., 226). Sicinius banished 
Coriolanus ‘in the name a’ th’ people, / And in the power of us the tribunes’.  What comparable 
claim could the periodical writers make?  Their pronouncements always implied a prior, tacit and 
tautologous assertion of the authority to make pronouncements. A key issue for periodical 
writers – especially in the early issues of new periodicals – was to establish themselves as having 
the authority to pronounce judgments on their culture and to establish periodicals as an 
appropriate venue in which to do so. 
For example, when a reviewer writes, ‘we solemnly proscribe this poem from the English 
fireside’, or declares that the ‘sentence of excommunication from the poets of England has been 
pronounced, enrolled, and ratified’, the issue at stake is whether such an utterance can be a 
felicitous performative (Roberts 463; Mason V, 186).  Do the periodical writers have the 
authority to pass judgements in the way that they do, or are these utterances a kind of parody of 
legal, ecclesiastical, medical or royal pronouncements, which borrow an authoritative-sounding 
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form of words, but without any inherent authority?  To negotiate this question, these two 
performative utterances both sought to bolster their authority by appealing to external support.  
In the first case, the Monthly Review wrote ‘we solemnly proscribe this poem from the English 
fireside, and summon all that religion, morality and policy enjoin to give authority to the 
interdict.’  In the second case, Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine wrote ‘the public voice has 
been lifted up against Hunt, – and the sentence of excommunication from the poets of England 
has been pronounced, enrolled, and ratified.’  Just as Sicinius claims to speak for the Roman 
citizens, the periodical writers claimed to speak with an authority that was not their own, but was 
vested in them by something else – religion, morality, policy, or public consensus.  A shared, 
social authority spoke through the mouthpiece of the periodicals.  In fact, however, the 
periodicals sought to create the consensus they invoked by behaving as though it already existed.  
It was not clear to all readers that religion, morality and policy did in fact support the periodical’s 
pronouncement.  But by behaving as though it were, the periodical tried to construct a consensus 
about religion, morality and policy among its readers that authorised its performative utterance.  
The periodicals, then, invoked existing authorities not to subordinate themselves to them, but to 
establish themselves alongside them. 
Among the authoritative discourses evoked was the code of conduct for a gentleman.  
Richard Cronin uses two duels fought between writers in the years after Waterloo as the starting 
point for his analysis of two key factors shaping the period’s literary culture: its increasingly 
polarised and acrimonious disagreements and its pervasive concern with the social status of those 
who made their living from writing.  Gentlemen traditionally had no profession, living instead on 
private means.  By this criterion most periodical writers were ineligible.  But a gentleman could 
also be recognised by his modes of speech and especially his authority to utter certain 
performatives – such as ‘I challenge you’ in the code of duelling.3  On Cronin’s account, part of 
the periodical writers’ project was to establish themselves as a cadre of professional writers with 
the social status of gentlemen.  They asserted that status by employing a performative utterance – 
the challenge – that was only available to gentlemen.  They revealed the tenuousness of their 
status when they betrayed their ignorance of the finer points of duelling culture – sometimes with 
fatal results. 
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This anxiety about their social status shows that, when they sought to give their writing 
illocutionary force, the periodical writers could not rely on a position of established authority.  
For Austin, the performative utterance ‘I name this ship’ only works if uttered by someone with 
the authority to name this particular ship.  That authority is established elsewhere and prior to the 
utterance: saying ‘I name this ship’ cannot in itself give you the authority to name ships.  This, 
however, is exactly the task the periodical writers set for themselves: to cultivate a self-
authorising style, which would simultaneously establish their authority as cultural arbiters and 
exercise that authority.  Indeed, the authority was established by exercising it, in the act of 
exercising it.  The self-authorising style, then, had a double illocutionary force that both 
performed an action and performed the authority to execute that action.  It was akin to what 
Angela Esterhammer identifies as a specifically ‘Romantic performative’. Esterhammer uncovers 
precursors to the modern debate about performatives in the language philosophy of the Romantic 
period, but she argues that Romantic thinkers tended to assign less fixed roles to speaker and 
hearer than modern philosophers do.  The Romantic performative constitutes the identities of 
speaker and hearer and the relationship between them.  Performative utterances in periodicals are 
of this sort.  They are not acts within an existing discursive regime, but part of an effort to found 
a discursive regime – one that would constitute and unite a middle-class reading audience (as 
Klancher argues) and a professional class of writers (as Cronin claims). 
The self-authorising style was tailor-made for periodical writing because it enforced its 
illocutionary acts of cultural definition by periodical iteration.  When a periodical ridiculed or 
condemned, praised or recommended, it performed an act in the dual present of reading and 
writing, but that act took place with reference to other acts that had occurred in the past or were 
projected in the future.  Judith Butler draws attention to the way in which performatives are 
ritualised and thus located in relation to repetition: 
The illocutionary speech act performs its deed at the moment of the utterance, and yet to 
the extent that the moment is ritualized, it is never merely a single moment.  The 
‘moment’ in ritual is a condensed historicity: it exceeds itself in past and future 
directions, an effect of prior and future invocations that constitute and escape the instance 
of utterance. (3) 
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Periodical publication meant that any utterance in a review or magazine was likewise constituted 
in relation to past and future iterations.  While this applies to periodical publication per se, it is 
especially characteristic of series, which were a key tool for constructing periodical authority.  
Whether in formal numbered series such as those on the ‘Cockney School’ or ‘Lake School’ in 
Blackwood’s, or in looser series such as Jeffrey’s repeated attacks on Wordsworth in the 
Edinburgh, organising articles serially helped to establish their authority. 
Periodical pronouncements reinforced their authority by referring backwards to what the 
magazine had already achieved (‘Before we appeared, the art of criticism was indeed a truly 
miserable concern’, Blackwood’s claimed, ‘We put an end to this in six months’) and forwards to 
what it would do (Z. ended the fifth Cockney school article by promising Hunt ‘we shall come 
back to thee anon’) (“Preface”, 22; Mason V, 278). Keats registered the effectiveness of this 
strategy when he worried about being the subject of a future Blackwood’s article.  ‘There has 
been a flaming attack on Hunt in [Blackwood’s] Edinburgh Magazine’ he wrote.  ‘I never read 
anything so virulent – accusing him of the greatest Crimes […] I have no doubt that the second 
Number was intended for me’ (Rollins 180). One way in which periodical writers enforced their 
authority to make judgments with illocutionary force was to reiterate those judgments 
periodically. 
But while the self-authorising style was powerfully iterable, it was also citational.  The 
authority of the periodicals’ pronouncements never quite managed to inhere in the 
pronouncements themselves, but did so only with reference to other pronouncements.  Derrida 
makes clear that this is a condition of performatives in general: 
Could a performative utterance succeed if its formulation did not repeat a ‘coded’ or 
iterable utterance, or in other words, if the formula I pronounce in order to open a 
meeting, launch a ship or a marriage were not identifiable as conforming with an iterable 
model, if it were not identifiable in some way as a ‘citation’? (18) 
The marriage ceremony, for example, only ‘works’ – only has the illocutionary force ascribed to 
it – because we know it has worked in the past.  It’s difficult to imagine the ‘first’ marriage 
ceremony.  The Romantic periodicals sought to found a new position of cultural authority, but 
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could only do so by citing existing authorities.  The self-authorising style of the Romantic 
periodicals could not give birth to itself sui generis.  It therefore cited legal, ecclesiastical, 
medical and monarchical formulae of authoritative speech, as well as literary precursors such as 
the moral essays of Johnson, Addison and Steele, or the Junius Letters. 
In seeking to prop itself against these existing forms of authoritative utterance, the self-
authorising style often employed them ironically.  The examples cited above offer the 
periodicals’ sentence of banishment as a self-consciously parodic imitation of actual banishment.  
Figurative excommunication from the republic of letters was pronounced in deliberately outsized 
rhetoric.  Irony protected the periodical writers from difficult questions about the status of their 
authority and the effectiveness of their pronouncements, while allowing an emergent form of 
authority to appear as an ironic citation of existing forms of authority.  Nonetheless, it aimed to 
move beyond these other authorities, to elide them, in order to generate its own authority through 
periodical reiteration.  Once this point of autonomy was reached, the performatives uttered in 
periodicals worked by citing earlier performatives uttered in periodicals, rather than by citing 
utterances from elsewhere.  Habituated by legal training, which many of them had received, to 
the weight of precedents found in case law rather than enshrined in a legal code, periodical 
writers understood the authority of custom and practice.  Having reached a certain critical mass, 
the style of the periodical writers ceased to prop itself up on external sources of authority and 
became self-sustaining: an authority unto itself. 
The point of cultivating an authoritative style was to perform effective acts of cultural 
definition that would shape the profiles of public individuals and call readers into socio-cultural 
groups organised around shared perceptions, concerns and prejudices.  Such acts of cultural 
definition involved interpellating readers as members of audiences, but they also involved 
defining the images of public figures.  These two effects were mutually supporting, since one 
badge of membership in a particular audience was a certain attitude towards particular public 
figures, and one way in which public figures were defined was by their meaning for a particular 
audience.  In Louis Althusser’s classic parable of the role of ideology in subject formation, 
ideology recruits individuals as subjects like a policeman hailing someone in the street. When 
you hear the policeman’s call and turn around, you identify yourself as the one addressed, and 
thus as subject to his authority.  In Althusser’s story, the subject is constituted in language, and 
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this process of interpellation (from the French interpeller, to hail) requires the subject’s 
complicity, even though no individual escapes being hailed as a subject.  Judith Butler, however, 
argues that ‘the linguistic constitution of the subject can take place without the subject’s 
knowing, as when one is constituted out of earshot, as, say, the referent of a third-person 
discourse’ (33).  The individual’s complicity is not, after all, required.  ‘Indifferent to your 
protests, the force of interpellation continues to work.  One is still constituted by discourse, but at 
a distance from oneself’ (33). Both aspects of the periodicals’ work of cultural definition can 
therefore be understood as interpellations.  The readers were complicit in their interpellation as 
audience members, while the public figures were interpellated ‘at a distance’ without their 
complicity. 
One does not have to accept that the subject in general is constituted in language, as 
Althusser, Butler, Lacan and others urge, to see that professional writers in particular are 
constituted in language.  And not only in the language they use (which, of course, is not their 
own), but also in the ways others speak and write about them.  So the key question in, for 
example, the Blackwood’s attacks on Leigh Hunt, is not ‘what kind of person is Leigh Hunt’, nor 
even ‘what kind of writer is Leigh Hunt’, but ‘who will define Leigh Hunt in the public sphere’?  
Hunt constructed his own public persona, which remained remarkably consistent across the 
different forms, genres and venues in which he wrote, including journalism and political 
commentary, theatre reviews, literary essays and reviews, personal essays and poems.  But the 
Blackwood’s writers created a rival version of Leigh Hunt, a caricature of aspects of the persona 
he created for himself.  This Hunt was a tea-drinking fop, a coward, a libeller, a radical 
demagogue, an atheist and an enemy to morality.  At stake in the acrimonious exchanges 
between the Examiner and Blackwood’s is which of these characterisations of Hunt will prevail 
in the minds of the public, and which periodical, by saying that Hunt is like this or that, will 
make him like this or that in the public imagination.  Pierre Bourdieu describes the ‘field of 
cultural production’ as: 
[T]he site of struggles in which what is at stake is the power to impose the dominant 
definition of the writer and therefore to delimit the population of those entitled to take 
part in the struggle to define the writer. (42) 
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Bourdieu’s generalised statement, based primarily on his study of nineteenth-century France, 
illuminates the dimensions of the particular struggle in which British Romantic periodical writers 
engaged.  Their aim was not so much to win an argument with their opponents, as it was to claim 
the right to define the nature of the argument.  Policing their culture, the periodical writers 
sought the same kind of defining power as Althusser’s policeman: the power to constitute the 
subjects of the realm whose order they defined and upheld. 
But the policeman in Althusser’s story is himself interpellated just as much as the 
passerby.  This interpellation doesn’t just take place as a prior condition of the policeman’s being 
able to hail another subject in his turn.  Instead, it takes place (or is reiterated) in the very act of 
hailing.  The status of the policeman as a subject is somewhat confused by the way in which he 
slips, in Althusser’s anecdote, from being an individual himself to being only an allegorical 
figure for ideology and its operations.  If we read the policeman as a subject in his own right, 
however, then his shout is a kind of performative utterance, which hails the addressee and the 
speaker simultaneously.  The shout identifies the passerby as subject to his authority, but it also 
identifies the policeman himself as the voice of authority.  If, following Foucault, we reject a 
top-down model of power as something possessed by some individuals and exercised over 
others, and think of power instead as something that circulates among individuals, subjecting 
those apparently in authority as much as those over whom authority is exercised, then we can see 
the policeman as the object of interpellation too.  In ridiculing ‘pimpled Hazlitt’, periodical 
writers concurrently rendered Hazlitt ridiculous and constituted themselves as cultural 
authorities.  This dual function of performative utterances – their effect on both speaker and 
hearer, writer and reader, was part of the secret of the self-authorising style’s power, which 
allowed periodical writers to establish their authority in the act of exercising it.  But it also ran 
the risk of trapping the periodical writers in the very system they cultivated, just as Althusser’s 
policeman is arguably interpellated by ideology just as much as the passerby he hails. 
The rhetorical arsenal employed by the periodical writers could also be turned against 
them.  As writers for publication, they too could be the objects of performative characterisations 
enacted by others without their consent.  Periodical writers mostly sought to protect themselves 
from this kind of unwelcome attention behind a screen of anonymity, and by cultivating the 
corporate identity of the magazine.  There were many complaints about the asymmetry this 
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created.  Coleridge grumbled in Biographia Literaria that periodical writers were ‘no longer to 
be questioned without exposing the complainant to ridicule, because, forsooth, they are 
anonymous critics, and authorised as “synodical individuals” to speak of themselves plurali 
majestatico!’ (I, 42).4  But anonymity was never perfect and often penetrable, as those periodical 
writers who took part in duels knew very well.  Rhetorical counter-attacks were more common 
than duels; more common, and no less fatal, at least for the professional identity of the periodical 
writer.  Creatures of writing, made out of language, they could be unmade in language too. 
This annihilation in language was what Blackwood’s threatened for Leigh Hunt and the 
Cockney School, what the Quarterly threatened for Keats and what the Edinburgh threatened for 
Wordsworth.  It didn’t physically kill any of them – despite Shelley’s suggestion in the ‘Preface’ 
to Adonais that the Quarterly was directly responsible for Keats’s death – but if fully successful 
it would have silenced them as published writers (Shelley, 390-392). Controversy was good for 
sales (Francis Jeffrey wrote ‘to be learned and right is no doubt the first requisite –but to be 
ingenious and original and discursive is perhaps more than the second in a publication which can 
only do good by remaining popular’ (qtd Christie 29)) and so the periodicals had a vested interest 
in prolonging hostilities rather than winning outright.  But when the parties were sworn political 
enemies, they sought to destroy each other’s authority, as well as each other’s livelihood. 
Once their self-authorising style was established, the periodicals became a powerful 
institution shaping and policing Romantic literary culture.  William Hazlitt accused William 
Gifford, editor of the Quarterly, of being ‘the Government critic […] the invisible link that 
connects literature with the police’ (Hazlitt, IX, 13). But the periodicals aspired to patrol literary 
culture not as special constables but as vigilantes who detected wrongdoing, passed sentence and 
inflicted punishment all at once.  If the Blackwood’s attacks on Leigh Hunt had been fully 
successful, if they had dictated the dominant characterisation of him in the public mind, then 
they would have been more effective as sanctions against him than the prison sentence imposed 
on him by the courts.  Prison did not silence Hunt, who continued the edit the Examiner from his 
cell, and it raised his credibility by making him a martyr.  Blackwood’s sought to discredit him 
by ridiculing him and labelling him as immoral.  They aimed, then, for a kind of authority that 
not only existed without the support of legal authority, but actually surpassed legal authority to 
reach where the law could not.  For this reason, I think Nicholas Roe is mistaken, in his 
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biography of Hunt, to dwell on Hunt’s imprisonment but to dismiss the Cockney School essays 
in a paragraph (306). The essays were in fact a greater threat to Hunt’s literary and political 
programme than the prison.  In some cases, at least, periodicals policed the literary sphere more 
effectively than the police themselves. 
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